Just War

From January 16 to February 28, 1991, military forces of a United Nations coalition attacked Iraqi military forces engaged in a military occupation of Kuwait (Mazarr 93-157). The Coalition ground forces began their assault on February 24, after several weeks of Coalition air attacks (Hutchison 121). On the evening of February 25, Iraqi troops in hundreds of vehicles began withdrawing from Kuwait City, forming a column that stretched for miles on the highway leading north toward Iraq (Gordon 369). Coalition airplanes bombed the lead vehicles, blocking the withdrawal and creating a huge traffic jam; the Coalition air forces then sent sortie after sortie to bomb the trapped vehicles (Gordon 370). When it was over hundreds of wrecked vehicles and dozens of Iraqi corpses littered the highway, and the devastation led a Washington Post reporter to dub the scene "The Highway of Doom" (Claiborne).

After the war, commentators questioned the morality of bombing the withdrawing Iraqis. Some simply called it a "slaughter" or a "massacre" (Vaux 33; Clark 54). Others questioned it in terms of the criteria of the "just war" tradition. Thus, one claimed that the bombing "was not a fight by jus in bello, standards . . . for those incinerated had no capacity to fight back" (Elshtain 53). Another argued that while the war convention treats retreating soldiers as legitimate targets, the bombing was wrong because it was too easy: "A 'turkey shoot' is not a combat between combatants" (Walzer 1992:14).

This paper asks whether Coalition forces violated "just war" criteria by bombing the Iraqi soldiers withdrawing on the highway out of Kuwait City in the final days of the war. As will be shown below, this is a question that concerns the jus in bello criterion of proportionality. I conclude that, although the question is a close one, the bombing did not constitute a clear violation of the principle of proportionality.

I will assume in this paper what has been debated elsewhere, namely, that the Coalition's decision to use military force against Iraq was morally justified and therefore satisfied the jus ad bellum criteria of the "just war" tradition. If the Coalition's actions do not satisfy these criteria, then the bombing was wrong. If the Coalition was right to go to war, then the question whether the bombing was justified remains. Thus, I do not dispense with the jus ad bellum issue because I think the answer to it is undisputable, but because the jus in bello issue seems to me to be the more immediate issue, and the one that most concerned the American public and its leaders (Atkinson 470; Gordon 416; Vaux 33).

The jus in bello criteria--the principles of proportionality and discrimination-concern the rules of engagement, i.e., how the war is fought (Walzer 21). The principle of discrimination forbids the direct targeting of noncombatants (Walzer 1977:151). Whether the bombing was proper does not invoke this principle because it appears that the Iraqi column contained only military personnel who had been occupying Kuwait City (Gordon 369; Walzer 1992:14). Where noncombatants are not present, only the principle of proportionality limits the use of weapons (Johnson 1984:58). Thus, with regard to whether the bombing satisfied "just war" criteria, the appropriate focus is on whether the bombing violated the principle of proportionality.

In general, applying the principle of proportionality means "determining what are the upper limits of the use of force that may rationally be employed" in achieving just war goals (Johnson 1984:120). Put simply, this means one should not maim an opponent if it is possible to disarm him without doing so, and one should not kill an opponent if it is possible to secure the desired end by injuring him (Johnson 1981:198). The idea is to apply the minimum force necessary to achieve one's legitimate objectives (Ramsey 1983: 469; Johnson 1984:145). In short, the principle of proportionality affirms that having satisfied the principle of discrimination does not justify limitless killing of combatants (Ramsey 1983:440).

The requirements of proportionality are, virtually by definition, relative and thus subject to considerable and perhaps inconclusive debate (Johnson 1981:196). One reason, perhaps, is the difficulty in breaking down the principle into analytically discrete units that provide concrete parameters for decision-making. I cannot surmount this difficulty, but I will use two means of clarifying how I view the principle and how I use it in this essay. For analytical precision I will rely on the formal model that William V. O'Brien proposes for understanding the principle's application. To clarify the application of the principle I will propose two historical incidents as paradigms for the proportionate use of force in war.

In William O'Brien's model, the principle of proportionality requires a two-fold analysis. First, one begins by determining whether the harm one's tactics intend is proportionate to a discrete, legitimate military end (40). The legitimacy of the military end is a matter of international law and judgments of reasonableness in the light of standard military practice (42). Second, one determines whether the harm is proportionate to the object of the war, the just cause (40). The calculation of the proportionality of means employed in pursuing the just cause are matters of balancing the probable good and evil in a war in light of the probability of success (42).

Two observations about my use of this model are in order. The first concerns the second component of O'Brien's model, which raises a question regarding the proper war aims in the Persian Gulf war. I assume that the jus ad bellum criteria were satisfied with respect to the Coalition's war aims. I assume this with regard to the aims expressly set forth in United Nations Resolution 678, which authorized Coalition forces to use "all necessary means" to enforce U.N. Resolution 660, which called for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally. I also assume it, with regard to the Coalition aim of ensuring regional stability and security. The legitimacy of this war aim has been debated, since it was not authorized by the U.N. in so many words (Vaux 5; Coll 208). I affirm it for three reasons, however. First, it was a clear but unspoken goal of the United States (Atkinson 208; Gordon 476). Second, commentators have offered rational arguments that this aim satisfied the jus ad bellum criteria (Weigel: 23, 26; Johnson 1992: 450). Third, U.N. Resolution 678 also authorized the Coalition to use "all necessary means . . . to restore international peace and security in the area" (S.C. Res. 678). Though the difference in the two war aims does affect a proper proportionality analysis, I believe that the ultimate conclusion is the same in either case.

The second observation concerns how to apply the model in a concrete historical setting. Paul Ramsey gives an example: the propriety of using incapacitating gas in counter-insurgency warfare. Using a nauseating gas against intrenched enemy forces appears to promise making war less destructive in the target area and therefore more proportionate (Ramsey 1983: 467). The object of modern war is incapacitation rather than death, and using such gas instead of flamethrowers would serve the ends of incapacitation without "unnecessary" killing (Ramsey 1983: 470-75). However, the use of incapacitating gas could well escalate to the use of deadly gas by an enemy, rendering an act that appears proportionate in the immediate context of a battle to become disproportionate when one considers all possible consequences (Ramsey 1983: 476).

Ramsey's illustration finds support in one incident in the Coalition's conduct of the Persian Gulf war. At one point a Marine commander rejected a request by an officer in the field to use tear gas against an intransigent Iraqi position, for fear of "crossing the threshold" and inviting Iraqi retaliation with lethal gas (Gordon 367). Ramsey's tear gas illustration shows that the question of proportionality can involve weighing a favorable balance of immediate good and evil effects against a potentially greater imbalance of more distant good and evil effects.

However, the literature of the just war tradition does not appear to give as much attention to issues of proportionality as it does to issues of discrimination, perhaps due to an impression that the proportionality rules are too vague and permissive to produce meaningful limitations (O'Brien 338). Decisions of proportionality necessarily involve calculating probabilities and anticipating unknown consequences of war (Johnson 1981: 198; Geyer 147). For this reason, I suggest the following two historical incidents as illustrations of the application of the principle of proportionality and as paradigms for understanding what limitations the principle might set.

The first paradigm is based on observations James Turner Johnson offered with regard to a classic battle for strategic position. In 1862 a Union army commanded by General Henry W. Halleck moved south out of Tennessee into northern Mississippi to seize the city of Corinth and cut the Confederate's only rail line into Memphis. Although Corinth contained a Confederate army of around 70,000 men, Halleck did not intend to achieve his objective by annihilating those forces but by outmaneuvering them so they would have to abandon the city without a major battle (McPherson 416-17). In this he succeeded. The capture of Corinth resulted in no major loss of life on the battlefield because Halleck entrenched his army around most of the city but avoided complete encirclement so that the Confederate soldiers had an escape route (Johnson 1981:284-91) . For Johnson, Halleck's war of position and maneuver is thus a paradigm for the possibility of proportionate means in warfare.

The second paradigm concerns a World War II event that illustrates the "strategy of annihilation," a part of U.S. military theory which provides that the primary goal of strategy is the destruction of enemy forces (Atkinson 452). Unconditional surrender of the Axis powers in World War II required occupation of their countries, and this could only be done by destroying their war machines (Blumenson 7). In late July 1944, American forces finally broke through German defenses that had the Allies bottled up in Normandy (Blumenson 247-335). By mid August American forces had driven south and then east to come in behind the German defenses, trapping an entire army in a pocket whose only escape was a gap between American units in Argentan to the south and Canadian units near Falaise to the north (Blumenson 479-527). Although the Allied air and artillery forces rained extensive destruction on the German army, which had no effective air support, Allied commanders chose not to close the Argentan-Falaise gap and destroy the German army there (Blumenson 555-58). Strategists such as B.H. Liddell Hart later considered this a critical mistake; closing the gap could have shortened the war considerably by preventing further effective German resistance in France (556-67). Though not stated in just war terms, the criticism of the Allied decision is nevertheless an argument for how great destruction in the immediate context might be proportionate, leading to the need for less destruction in the long run.

I begin my application of the proportionality principle with a summary of what actually occurred on the Kuwaiti battlefield. Although my authorities in this regard are limited to secondary sources, these sources rely in large part on primary sources, and there does not appear to be significant dispute among the sources as to what actually happened.

The first offensive action by the Coalition in the Persian Gulf War began on January 16, 1991, when American forces launched cruise missiles at targets inside Iraq (Hutchison 68). From that day until the day of the bombing on the highway, Coalition air forces engaged in thousands of sorties against Iraqi military forces in the Kuwaiti theater of operations (Hutchison 83-130). Iraqi military forces suffered thousands of deaths as a result of this bombing even before the ground war began (Mazarr 131-32).

On February 24, 1991, the ground war began when U.S. marines attacked across the Saudi-Kuwaiti border on the coastal road leading into Kuwait City from the south (Hutchison 121). Ground forces stationed along the Saudi-Iraqi border further west later attacked directly into Iraq with the idea of driving northeast and then east into the flanks of the Iraqi position in Kuwait (Mazarr 136-46). In the evening of February 25, U.S. marines were closing in on Kuwait City from the south, though they were still several miles from the city (Coll 210). Coalition intelligence units that evening detected largescale troop movements in the city, and they intercepted Iraqi withdrawal orders giving priority to commanders and their staffs (Gordon 369). Kuwaitis living near the highway observed the Iraqi column leaving the city in the dark of night and heading west towards A1 Jahra where the highway ultimately led north into Iraq (Coll 206).

U.S. commanders ordered planes into the air to stop the convoy by bombing the lead vehicles with cluster bombs (Gordon 370). These first few attacks blocked the highway above Al Jahra, causing many vehicles to strike out across the desert (Atkinson 451). Coalition planes continued through the night bombing the vehicles up and down the stalled column, flying dozens of sorties out over the area (Coll 204; Gordeon 370; Hutchison 130). Planes returning to the aircraft carrier Ranger after a sortie were quickly reloaded with whatever type of bombs were at hand (Atkinson 450-51). Pilots used various phrases to describe the ease with which they bombed the column, including "turkey shoot" and "sport bombing" (Claiborne; Atkinson 451).

By the next morning, a two-mile long stretch of highway was littered with bombedout vehicles, nearly all of which were civilian cars or trucks stolen from Kuwait City , many filled with goods looted from the city (Mazarr 146; Gordon 370). Only about 2 percent were tanks or armored personnel carriers (Atkinson 451). After the cease-fire, around 1,500 wrecked and abandoned vehicles were counted on this stretch of highway (Atkinson 451; Coll 204). However, it is now apparent that more Iraqis fled their vehicles than were killed and that press reports greatly exaggerated the loss of life; only 200 to 300 dead were found among the wreckage along the highway (Gordon 370; Coll 205).

My application of the principle to the events narrated above begins with a review of two criticisms of the bombing, criticisms based in general terms on some form of the jus in bello criterion of proportionality. For the reasons below, I find fault with these criticisms.

Kenneth Vaux argues that the bombing constituted more killing than necessary to accomplish the legitimate Coalition objectives (2-5). He argues that whereas the U.N. resolutions called only for unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, an additional and thus illegitimate Coalition goal was the dismantling of Iraq's military capacity (5). He contends that in light of the call from Iraqi central headquarters for a withdrawal, and given the idea that such withdrawal was the sole, legitimate goal of the war, the bombing of troops seeking to fulfill that goal "can only be called a massacre" (33). Vaux's argument raises a question regarding the second level of analysis in O'Brien's model: the question of proportionality with regard to ultimate war goals (O'Brien 40, 42).

I disagree with Vaux on two grounds. First, there are grounds for arguing that decreasing Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbors was a legitimate goal of the Coalition ((Weigel 23, 26; Johnson 1992:450). One doesn't have to depend on the judgments of political scientists in this regard, because U.N. Resolution 678 authorized the Coalition to "use all necessary means" not only to enforce Resolution 660 but also "to restore international peace and security in the area" (S.C. Res. 678). A broad reading of the latter phrase might authorize the diminution of Iraqi capacity to wage war. As Walzer argues, "it follows from the argument for justice that wars can end too soon . . . Unless they create a 'better state of peace,' [cease-fires] may simply fix the conditions under which the fighting will be resumed, at a later time and with a new intensity" (1977:123).

However, even assuming that enforcement of U.N. Resolution 660 provided the limit of legitimate Coalition objectives, the Coalition had a right not to view the Iraqi central command's order of withdrawal as a fulfillment of those objectives. The reason is that Iraqi political leaders knew the rules of the game: they knew how the United Nations worked. Iraq argued in October 1990 for Security Council action against Israeli killing of Palestinian protestors (Hiro 211). After the temporary cease-fire Iraq offered a conditional acceptance of U.N. resolutions on Kuwait, and when that failed Iraq finally communicated an unconditional acceptance of the resolutions (Hiro 392; Hutchison 133). Vaux's strict construction of the U.N. resolution calls in turn for a strict and unequivocal compliance with its terms. The Coalition was thus entitled to view the Iraqi's nighttime withdrawal, without official acceptance of Resolution 678, as not yet being in conformity with the legitimate Coalition goal of strict compliance with the resolution.

Second, it cannot be said that the Iraqi withdrawal begun on the evening of February 25 was clearly the beginning of a complete and unequivocal withdrawal from Kuwait. Apart from the lack of an official Iraqi acceptance of Resolution 678, there was continued armed resistance to Coalition forces in the days following the bombing (Gordon 387-95). There is little reason for blaming Coalition military forces for viewing the withdrawal as anything other than a tactical retreat to a more secure part of the battlefield, or perhaps an attempt to reinforce the western portion of the Iraqi perimeter--which is what some Coalition military leaders claimed to have suspected (Coll 208). In short, the withdrawal fell short of even equivocal compliance with U.N. Resolution 678.

Another argument some have proposed raises a question regarding the first level of analysis in O'Brien's model: the question of proportionality with regard to discrete, legitimate military ends authorized by international law and by reasonable, standard military practice (O'Brien 40, 42). Thus, Jean Elshtain argues that the bombing violated jus in bello standards because the Iraqi forces "had no capacity to fight back" (53). Ramsey Clark echoes this claim, boldly stating that the Coalition killed thousands of Iraqi soldiers who were "essentially defenseless," in violation of provisions of the Hague Convention of 1899 that prohibited the use,of excessive force (38, 170, 178). Similarly, and with specific reference to the bombing, Michael Walzer argues: "One may object to killing in war, even in just war, whenever it gets too easy. A 'turket shoot' is not a combat between combatants (Walzer 1992:14).

I question the assumption that appears to underlie these comments, namely, that if one's weapons outperform an opponent's, that alone makes pulling the trigger morally problematic. For one thing, Iraqi forces were consistently outgunned throughout the conflict. In the principal armored clashes of the war--at Medina Ridge and at 73 Easting-the thermal sights, higher rate of fire, and greater firing range of U.S. tanks resulted in the decimation of Iraqi tank forces (Atkinson 466; Gordon 407-08). This led one tank commander to remark that this, too, was "more like a one-sided clay pigeon shoot" (Gordon 408). Thus, by the "whenever it gets too easy" standard, the bombing could hardly be seen as much more disproportionate than many other battles of the ground war. To be sure, Ramsey Clark takes just this position: the Coalition's technological advantage means for him that a disproportionate use of force pervaded the Coalition's activities on the battlefield (38-39, 50). But this goes too far, as it risks rendering an army with air or armor superiority incapable of fighting a just war.

Moreover, despite the lopsided nature of these battles, the Iraqi forces did have the capacity to fight and inflict injury, as the list of hundreds of Coalition service people "killed in action" demonstrates (Hutchison App. C). Iraqi forces continued to shoot down Coalition aircraft throughout the 100 hours of the ground war (Atkinson 456-57; Hutchison 127, 134). Indeed, Coalition commanders who ordered the bombing of the Iraqi column calculated beforehand that the effort might result in a loss of up to three Coalition aircraft through antiaircraft fire (Gordon 370). Thus, the suggestion that the Iraqi forces were totally defenseless is not correct.

One suspects, of course, that these critics are concerned about something more than an imbalance of firepower between the Coalition and Iraqi forces. Thus, Walzer makes the further point that the retreating army posed no threat except to its own people (Walzer 1992: 14). On the other hand, Clark's criticism seems aimed more at the justice of the war itself ("The assault on Iraq was a war crime containing thousands of individual criminal acts") rather than how it was fought (206). The point of my response, however, is that the mere imbalance of firepower between Coalition and Iraqi forces on this occasion does not provide strong support for an argument that the bombing was not a proportionate act of war. The Iraqis, though outgunned, did not lose their status as combatants simply because their weapons weren't as effective as those of the Coalition.

My response to these criticisms of the bombing anticipates my conclusion that the bombing was not a clear use of disproportionate force, that it was probably justifiable even given the limited goal of evicting Iraq from Kuwait, and that it was quite justifiable given the broader goal of establishing peace and stability in the region.

I will first state my conclusions in terms of the two historical paradigms set forth in Section III above. One might argue that the limited U.N. goal of evicting Iraqi forces from Kuwait appears to fit the paradigm of Halleck and the Union Army in its war of maneuver to capture Corinth from the Confederates without a full-fledged battle. However, given Iraq's proven ability to threaten its neighbors in the region, and given that U.N. Resolution 678 authorized restoration of peace and stability, it was justifiable to view the appropriate goals of the war as including efforts to significantly weaken Iraq's ability to continue threatening Kuwait militarily. Indeed, according to James Turner Johnson, the principle of proportionality "may be further drawn out to include restraining the attacker from similar acts in the future" (Johnson 1984: 58). Given the flat terrain between Iraq and Kuwait, Kuwait's small territory, its small military, and Iraqi military strength and demonstrated ambitions in the region, enforcing the U.N. resolutions required something more than the mere seizure of a strategic position.

One might then argue that the goal of weakening Iraq's ability to threaten Kuwait better fits the paradigm of the Allied forces seeking to destroy the German Army escaping through the Argentan-Falaise gap in France during World War II. However, U.N. Resolution 678 was no license for seeking Iraq's unconditional surrender. Indeed, American military leaders had outlined a plan to continue the war all the way to Baghdad, but there was neither a likelihood of success nor a likelihood of domestic or international support for it, and so the plan was shelved (Gordon 450-54). The Coalition did not want a power vacuum in the region, so the total destruction of Iraqi military power was not in the cards, either.

As a result, the bombing of the Iraqi withdrawal fits somewhere in between these two paradigms. It was part of a battle that was more than a war of strategic position and less than a war of annihilation. And yet the situation fits Walzer's argument that "wars can end too soon. " A ceasefire doesn't serve the purpose of just war if it simply fixes the conditions under which hostilities can resume in the future with greater intensity (1977: 123). In 1980 Iraq had unjustifiably invaded Iran. In 1990 it did the same to Kuwait. It fired Scud missiles indiscriminately into Israel. Failing to seriously injure the Iraqi war machine clearly risked more of the same. (Weigel 23, 27). The bombing of the Iraqi column could thus be viewed as part of the Coalition's legitimate attempt to inflict the kind of injury on Iraqi armed forces that would result in what Walzer would call "a better state of peace" once a ceasefire went into effect. In short, weakening Iraqi military strength would ensure the continued enforcement of U.N. Resolution 660.

Moreover, the bombing does not seem to have been disproportionate with regard to the immediate context of the ongoing battle. Coalition commanders justified the attack as an attempt to avoid possible reinforcement or regrouping of Iraqi forces elsewhere on the battlefield (Coll 208). Not all Iraqi troops were withdrawing or surrendering. Even after the bombing, Iraqi armored units took up defensive positions just west of the Kuwait border and engaged U.S. forces in battle (Gordon 387-95). In addition, the Coalition forces were attacking a column of vehicles, not the many soldiers who had abandoned their weapons and were wandering in the desert.

Finally, it must be affirmed that the fact one has achieved technological or tactical superiority over enemy forces should not alone bring into question what most would consider common sense about what is expected and thus morally acceptable in a modern conventional war. Does a soldier err in firing a long-range mortar at soldiers who are not within range to effectively shoot back? Were Allied warplanes, having achieved air superiority over France, justified in strafing Rommel's "defenseless" staff car (Hart 551)? That the Coalition had achieved air superiority and could bomb virtually at will should not raise any more moral issues than that raised by Allied air superiority in the latter days of World War II.

The above discussion does not answer what may be the ultimate question, namely, whether something other than bombing the Iraqi column so mercilessly might have achieved the legitimate goals of the Coalition. I can think of three responses. The first is that it is not clear that the criterion of proportionality requires the exhaustion of all possible alternatives in the midst of battle. This may seem to be a too formal response to the question, but it makes some sense in the real world. The heat of battle does not always allow for the measured consideration of alternatives. I certainly agree with Walzer that the criterion of proportionality is often so tied to military considerations as to risk rubber stamping the judgments of military professionals (1977: 129-30). I don't see a clear alternative, however, to giving the commanders in the field the benefit of the doubt in most instances, particularly where, as here, significant enemy resistance continued throughout the theater of operations.

Second, the only concrete alternatives in this case would seem to be using less force or simply allowing the column to go on its way. Given what I hold to be the legitimate goals of the Coalition, both alternatives are irresponsible. A just war must be fought and won, and that means the use of decisive force to ensure that the legitimate objectives are achieved. Coalition forces trapped and similarly shot up other withdrawing Iraqi columns during the ground war (Atkinson 482-83; Clark 48, 54). Allowing some or all of these columns to withdraw, along with their equipment and organization, could have put at risk not only other Coalition forces engaged in combat but also the Kuwaitis whom the withdrawing soldiers could continue to threaten in the future.

Third, I view the question as unanswerable in the extreme. One may well ask whether the last shot of the war was absolutely necessary. One could almost certainly answer this question "probably not." But this seems to beg the question of whether, given that the shot was fired, it was entirely beyond legitimate goals of the war.

I summarize my conclusions by stating them in terms of William O'Brien's model of proportionality analysis. I conclude that the harm intended--the disabling of the Iraqi column withdrawing from Kuwait City--was proportionate to a discrete, legitimate military end--disrupting effective leadership of Iraqi forces in the field, destroying the Iraqi war machine, and preventing a regrouping of Iraqi forces elsewhere on the battlefield. This did not violate international law, which does not prohibit firing upon armed soldiers in retreat (Atkinson 452; Walzer 1992:14). In terms of the second level of O'Brien's model, I conclude that the harm was proportionate to the goal of ensuring regional stability, and that it was not clearly disproportionate to a more limited goal of enforcing the U.N resolutions that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait.

My argument has limitations, to be sure. I have not done justice to the complexities of the question whether the Coalition's war goals were proportionate and just. The answer to that question requires complicated judgments about history and international politics, judgments I cannot make with certainty. The question the bombing raises becomes more difficult the more narrow one's view becomes of the Coalition's legitimate war goals. I have also relied heavily on U.N. resolutions as providing the parameters of justice regarding the goals of the war. U.N. resolutions are not the ultimate measure of the jus ad bellum criteria, though I think in this case Iraq's invasion was an aggression whose undoing few could question was justifiable.

If nothing else, however, I hope to have shown that there are grounds for fair disagreement with some who, from a just war perspective, have criticized the bombing of the Iraqi column as a massacre. Just war theory assumes that the great killing and destruction caused by modern warfare can be justifiable. If for some reason a bombing such as this must be considered an immoral slaughter, then I will gladly conclude that so are nearly all acts of modern warfare waged against an enemy by a technologically superior military force.

Aug. 2, 1990	Iraqi forces invade Kuwait at 2:00 a.m. local time.
	U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 660 urging withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.
Aug. 6, 1990	President Bush orders American military forces to Saudi Arabia.
Nov. 29, 1990	U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 678 authorizing "all necessary means" to implement prior resolutions pertinent to Iraqi invasion and "restore international peace and security in the area. "
Jan. 12, 1991	U.S. Congress authorizes President Bush to use military forces to implement U.N. Resolution 678.
Jan. 16, 1991	Air campaign of Coalition forces begins.
Jan. 18, 1991	Iraqi Scud surface-to-surface missiles land in Israel.
Feb. 24, 1991	Ground campaign of Coalition forces begins.
Feb. 25, 1991	Late in the day Iraq military command orders a withdrawal from Kuwait.
Feb. 26, 1991	Hussein announces on Baghdad radio that Iraq is withdrawing from Kuwait in compliance with U.N. Resolution 660.
Feb. 27, 1991	Iraq delivers letter to U.N. Security Council accepting Resolution 660, 662, and 674, but rejecting others. Security Council demands unconditional acceptance of all 12 pertinent resolutions.
Feb. 28, 1991	President Bush orders temporary ceasefire if Iraq puts down its arms and stops launching Scud missiles, and he gives conditions for making ceasefire permanent. Iraq accepts conditions, including all pertinent U.N. Security Council resolutions.

* Source: D. Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War Appendix I (New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, Inc. 1992)

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Clark, Ramsey. 1992. The Fire This Time: U. S. War Crimes in the Gulf. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press. (An indictment of United States involvement in the Persian Gulf conflict, with discussion of international laws of war and extensive documentation of the U.S. military actions that allegedly violate those laws.).

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DeCosse, David E., ed. 1992. But Was It Just? Reflections on the Morality of the Persian Gulf War. New York: Doubleday (Essays examining, from the standpoint of just war thinking, several aspects of the Gulf War conflict and the moral issues involved).

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Hutchison, Kevin. 1995. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. (A fact book containing detailed chronology of Persian Gulf conflict and statistics on Coalition and Iraqi military forces)

Johnson, James Turner. 1984. Can Modern War Be Just? New Haven: Yale University Press. (An inquiry into whether the "just war" tradition offers a way of dealing with the realities of modern warfare, including nuclear deterrence and guerrilla warfare.)

------. 1981. Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and History Inquiry. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (A historical account of the development of just war thinking with illustrations from the history of Western warfare.).

Mazarr, Michael, Snider, Don, and Blackwell, James. 1993. Desert Storm: The Gulf War and What We Learned. Boulder: Westview Press.

O'Brien, William V. 1981. The Conduct of Just and Limited War. New York: Praeger Publishers. (A description and analysis of the criteria of "just war" and "limited war" traditions of thinking ethically about war.).

Ramsey, Paul. 1983. The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility. Savage, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Littlefield Adams Quality Paperbacks. (A series of articles and essays on just war doctrine and the responsible use of military force.).

------. 1961. War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War Be Conducted Justly? Princeton: Princeton University Press. (A historical statement of the ethical justification for Christian participation in the use of military force and of the conditions and limits of the "just war. ").

Vaux, Kenneth L. 1992. Ethics and the Gulf War: Religion, Rhetoric, and Righteousness. Boulder: Westview Press.

Walzer, Michael. 1977. Just and Unjust Wars. New York: Basic Books (Philosophical and historical justification of the idea of just war thinking as a condition of and limitation on war).

------. 1992. "Justice and Injustice in the Gulf War," in But Was It Just? Reflections on the Morality of the Persian Gulf War. Edited by David E. DeCosse. New York: Doubleday.

Weigel, George. 1992. "From Last Resort to Endgame: Morality, the Gulf War, and the Peace Process," in But Was It Just? Reflections on the Morality of the Persian Gulf War. Edited by David E. DeCosse. New York: Doubleday.